Syria… What Is to Be Done?

Syria is currently undergoing a complex phase of political and social disintegration following years of mass revolution, civil war, and multi-sided conflicts involving both local and imperial powers. Although this phase has ended—albeit temporarily—with the fall of the Assad regime and the assumption of leadership in the transitional period by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, headed by Ahmad al-Shara (Abu Muhammad al-Julani), the consequences of the war remain catastrophic.

The conflict, which has continued from the outbreak of the revolution in 2011 until 2024, has resulted in the death of more than half a million people. It has also triggered one of the most significant population displacement crises in modern history, with more than half of Syria’s population forced to flee their homes—either as internally displaced persons or as refugees abroad. This displacement has been accompanied by a sharp economic collapse: 80% of the population now lives below the poverty line, and Syria’s exports have declined by approximately 92%. In addition, the country’s social fabric has been severely fragmented due to the repression and massacres committed by the now-overthrown regime.

The interim regime in Syria is attempting to gain international acceptance by adopting a “moderate” discourse, particularly about minorities and international agreements—including its position on the Zionist entity. However, the recent massacres in the Syrian coastal region have reignited fears among minority groups of potential acts of retaliation, complicating the new regime’s efforts to achieve “stability.”
On March 16, Ahmad al-Shara announced a constitutional declaration outlining the five-year transitional phase in Syria. He emphasized the principle of separation of powers and the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms, such as freedom of opinion and expression and the right of women to participate in political life.
Nevertheless, al-Shara signed the draft declaration under the pressure of a new Israeli escalation, represented by an airstrike on Damascus that delivered a clear message of defiance to the fledgling regime.

Despite the reformist promises presented in the constitutional declaration, it effectively concentrates broad powers in the hands of the president during the transitional period. The president is granted the authority to appoint members of the government and the National Security Council, as well as judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court. He is also empowered to appoint one-third of the members of the People’s Assembly and select the committee responsible for determining the remaining two-thirds. This raises questions about how such a parliament can represent the various segments of Syrian society.

These concerns are further compounded by articles stipulating that the president must be of the Islamic faith and that Islamic Sharia shall be a principal source of legislation—provisions that risk creating tensions with Syria’s other ethnic and religious communities.

The current Syrian administration is facing immense challenges as it seeks to present itself as a state capable of asserting internal and external control. However, it is confronted by structural impediments that hinder the achievement of this objective. Chief among these is the absence of a unified regular army. Instead, the regime relies on a collection of armed factions attempting to reorganize themselves into a cohesive military force—an endeavour that could take decades.

In the face of these challenges, Ahmad al-Sharaʿ’s administration has opted to escalate tensions with Iran and Hezbollah while appeasing Russia and disregarding the ongoing Zionist aggression. This approach surprised many leftist forces, who were quick to accuse the new regime of treason and collaboration with imperialism.
This position can be interpreted within the context of efforts to establish the emerging state, which seeks to portray itself as a sovereign power capable of defending Syria and asserting its independence. However, the profound contradictions it faces complicate this endeavour, as the so-called “army” of the state remains, in essence, a group of militias attempting to coordinate among themselves—leaving them, at present, incapable of confronting the Zionist enemy or limiting Russian influence.

Conversely, escalation against Iran and Hezbollah appears to be a more accessible option. The new regime can exploit the genuine grievances stemming from Tehran and Hezbollah’s direct intervention in support of Bashar al-Assad, as well as capitalize on their current state of weakness and decline. This makes them convenient targets for mobilizing public sentiment and portraying the regime as a sovereign authority.

This strategy also aligns with al-Shara’s broader project, which aims to represent the Sunni community from a Salafi background—a current with a long history of fuelling sectarian and doctrinal conflicts. Inevitably, this will generate contradictions not only with many other Sunni components of Syrian society but also with its non-Sunni communities.

This political orientation reflects the map of regional alliances supporting the transitional regime in Syria. Turkey—the largest and most influential backer of al-Sharaʿ’s regime—remains a prominent member of NATO. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that the current transitional regime’s political line aligns closely with Ankara.

Thus far, the new authority has not taken even the most fundamental diplomatic steps to respond to Israeli airstrikes. It has not, for instance, requested a session of the UN Security Council and has limited itself to issuing statements of condemnation and denunciation—as if the bombings were occurring in another country entirely! In contrast, when minor border incidents occurred with Lebanon and Hezbollah, the regime escalated its response to the highest level, clearly revealing its priorities in both political and military strategy.
Despite these highly complex challenges, leftist and pro-democracy forces have a golden opportunity to build an alternative political project grounded in a broad, popular base bypassing sectarian borders capable of putting forward a new vision for Syria’s future. This project must genuinely and reasonably represent all segments of the Syrian population and confront the current regime through adequate political and grassroots pressure by forming a broad front that unites various political and social forces.

It is also essential that this project presents a strong economic and social vision that reinforces social justice. The financial and social dimension must feature prominently in the discourse of democratic forces as a counterweight to the new regime’s complete submission to the neoliberal agenda of international financial institutions—as evidenced by the participation of the current regime’s representative in the Davos Forum. This trajectory is bound to provoke conflict with the working majority of Syrians.

This project must rekindle hope in the possibility of political change through organized collective action. It should involve reviving popular committees in neighborhoods, reactivating professional unions, and rebuilding the civil society institutions dismantled by the Baathist regime. Moreover, the project must promote participatory democracy by enabling citizens to play an active role in decision-making processes that affect their daily lives—ensuring the sustainability of political and social transformation in Syria.
The greatest mistake that leftist and democratic forces could make is to fall back on rhetoric focused on accusations of treason, collaboration, and similar labels that strip the masses of their political agency. Resorting solely to criticism and condemnation ultimately paralyzes the opposition’s political effectiveness and reinforces the idea that current events are merely the result of foreign conspiracies. This creates an atmosphere of helplessness and surrender and prevents the development of a genuine political alternative.
The solution before democratic forces must begin from the bottom up. Belief in the power of the people and the building of grassroots organizations is the only practical path to confronting the dominant current within the transitional council. It is also the only viable route to constructing a revolutionary democratic alternative that returns power and wealth to the hands of the people.